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Encryption prevents unauthorized decoding, but does not ensure stealth—a security demand
that a mere presence of a message be undetectable. We characterize the ultimate limit of covert
communication that is secure against the most powerful physically-permissible adversary. We show
that, although it is impossible over a pure-loss channel, covert communication is attainable in the
presence of any excess noise, such as a 300K thermal blackbody. In this case, O(√n) bits can
be transmitted reliably and covertly in n optical modes using standard optical communication
equipment. The all-powerful adversary may intercept all transmitted photons not received by the
intended receiver, and employ arbitrary quantum memory and measurements. Conversely, we show
that this square root scaling cannot be outperformed. We corroborate our theory in a proof-
of-concept experiment. We believe that our findings will enable practical realizations of covert
communication and sensing, both for point-to-point and networked scenarios.
Encryption prevents unauthorized access to
transmitted information—a security need crit-
ical to modern-day electronic communication.
Conventional computationally-secure encryption1,2,
information-theoretic secrecy3,4, and quantum cryp-
tography5 offer progressively higher levels of secu-
rity. Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two
distant parties to generate shared secret keys over
a lossy-noisy channel that are secure from the most
powerful adversary allowed by physics. This shared
secret, when subsequently used to encrypt data us-
ing the one-time-pad cipher6, yields the most pow-
erful form of encryption. However, encryption does
not mitigate the threat to the users’ privacy from
the discovery of the very existence of the message
itself (e.g., seeking of “meta-data” as detailed in
the recent Snowden disclosures7), nor does it pro-
vide the means to communicate when the adver-
sary forbids it. Thus, low probability of detection
(LPD) or covert communication systems are de-
sirable that not only protect the message content,
but also prevent the detection of the transmission
attempt. Here we delineate, and experimentally
demonstrate, the ultimate limit of covert commu-
nication that is secure against the most powerful
adversary physically permissible—the same bench-
mark of security to which quantum cryptography
adheres for encrypted communication.
Covert communication is an ancient discipline8
revived by the communication revolution of the
last century. Modern developments include spread-
spectrum radio-frequency (RF) communication9,
where the signal power is suppressed below the
noise floor by bandwidth expansion; and steganog-
raphy10, where messages are hidden in fixed-size,
finite-alphabet covertext objects such as digital im-
ages. We recently characterized the information-
theoretic limit of classical covert communication on
an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel,
the standard model for RF channels11,12. We showed
that the sender Alice can reliably transmit O(√n)
bits to the intended receiver Bob in n AWGN chan-
nel uses with arbitrarily low probability of detec-
tion by the adversary Willie. Thus, a non-trivial
burst of covert bits can be transmitted when n is
large. Our work was generalized to other chan-
nel settings13–16. Similar square-root laws were also
found in steganography17, where it was shown that
Alice can modify O(√n) symbols in a covertext of
size n, embedding O(√n logn) hidden bits10,18–22.
Optical signaling23,24 is particularly attractive for
covert communication due to its narrow diffraction-
limited beam spread in free space25,26 and the ease
of detecting fiber taps using time-domain reflec-
tometry27. Our information-theoretic analysis of
covert communication on the AWGN channel also
applies to a lossy optical channel with additive Gaus-
sian noise when Alice uses a laser-light transmit-
ter and both Bob and Willie use coherent-detection
receivers. However, modern high-sensitivity opti-
cal communication components are primarily lim-
ited by noise of quantum-mechanical origin. Thus,
recent studies on the performance of physical opti-
cal communication have focused on this quantum-
2limited regime28–30. Here we establish the quan-
tum limits of covert communication. We demon-
strate that covert communication is impossible over
a pure-loss channel. However, when the channel
has any excess noise (e.g., the unavoidable thermal
noise from the blackbody radiation at the operat-
ing temperature), Alice can reliably transmitO(√n)
covert bits to Bob using n optical modes, even if
Willie intercepts all the photons not reaching Bob
and employs arbitrary quantum memory and mea-
surements. This is achievable using standard laser-
light modulation and homodyne detection (thus the
Alice-Bob channel is still an AWGN channel). Thus,
noise enables stealth. Indeed, if Willie’s detector
contributes excess noise (e.g., dark counts in photon-
counting detectors), Alice can covertly communicate
to Bob, even when the channel itself is pure-loss.
We also show that the square-root limit cannot be
outperformed. We corroborate our theoretical re-
sults with a proof-of-concept experiment, where the
excess noise in Willie’s detection is emulated by
dark counts of his single photon detector. This is
the first known implementation of a truly quantum-
information-theoretically secure covert communica-
tion system that allows communication when all
transmissions are prohibited.
INFORMATION-THEORETICALLY COVERT
COMMUNICATION
Quantum and classical information-theoretic
analyses of covert communication consider the
reliability and detectability of a transmission. We
introduce these concepts next.
Reliability—We consider a scenario where Alice
attempts to transmit M bits to Bob using n
optical modes while Willie attempts to detect her
transmission attempt. Each of the 2M possible
M -bit messages maps to an n-mode codeword, and
their collection forms a codebook. Since we consider
single-spatial-mode fiber and free-space optical
channels, each of the n modes in the codeword
corresponds to a signaling interval carrying one
modulation symbol. Desirable codebooks ensure
that the codewords, when corrupted by the channel,
are distinguishable from one another. This provides
reliability: a guarantee that the probability of
Bob’s error in decoding Alice’s message P
(b)
e < δ
with arbitrarily small δ > 0 for n large enough. In
practice, error-correction codes (ECCs) are used to
enable reliability.
Detectability— Willie’s detector reduces to a binary
hypothesis test of Alice’s transmission state given
his observations of the channel. Denote by PFA the
probability that Willie raises a false alarm when
Alice does not transmit, and by PMD the prob-
ability that Willie misses the detection of Alice’s
transmission. Under the assumption of equal prior
probabilities on Alice’s transmission state (unequal
prior probabilities do not affect the asymptotics11),
Willie’s detection error probability, P
(w)
e = (PFA +
PMD)/2. Alice desires a reliable signaling scheme
that is covert, i.e., ensures P
(w)
e ≥ 1/2− ǫ for an ar-
bitrarily small ǫ > 0 regardless of Willie’s quantum
measurement choice (since P
(w)
e = 1/2 for a random
guess). By decreasing her transmission power, Alice
can decrease the effectiveness of Willie’s hypothesis
test at the expense of the reliability of Bob’s de-
coding. Information-theoretically secure covert com-
munication is both reliable and covert. To achieve
it, prior to transmission, Alice and Bob share a se-
cret, the cost of which we assume to be substantially
less than that of being detected by Willie. Secret-
sharing is consistent with other information-hiding
systems10–12,18–22; however, as evidenced by the re-
cent results for a restricted class of channels14,15, we
believe that certain scenarios (e.g., Willie’s channel
from Alice being worse than Bob’s) will allow secret-
less optical covert communication.
ANALYSIS OF COVERT OPTICAL
COMMUNICATION
Here we outline the theoretical development of
quantum-information-theoretically secure covert
optical communication. Formal theorem statements
are deferred to the Methods, with detailed proofs in
the Supplementary Information.
Channel model—Consider a single-mode quasi-
monochromatic lossy optical channel E n¯Tηb of
transmissivity ηb ∈ (0, 1] and thermal noise mean
photon number per mode n¯T ≥ 0, as depicted in
Figure 1. Willie collects the entire ηw = 1 − ηb
fraction of Alice’s photons that do not reach
Bob but otherwise remains passive, not injecting
any light into the channel. Later we argue that
being active does not help Willie to detect Alice’s
transmissions. For a pure loss channel (n¯T = 0),
the environment input is in the vacuum state
ρˆE0 = |0〉〈0|E , corresponding to the minimum noise
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FIG. 1. Channel model. The input-output relationship
is captured by a beamsplitter of transmissivity ηb, with
the transmitter Alice at one of the input ports and the
intended receiver Bob at one of the output ports, and ηb
being the fraction of Alice’s signaling photons that reach
Bob. The other input and output ports of the beamsplit-
ter correspond to the environment and the adversary
Willie. Willie collects the entire ηw = 1 − ηb fraction
of Alice’s photons that do not reach Bob. This models
single-spatial-mode free-space and single-mode fiber op-
tical channels. Alice and Bob share a secret before the
transmission.
the channel must inject to preserve the Heisenberg
inequality of quantum mechanics.
Pure loss insufficient for covert communication—
Regardless of Alice’s strategy, reliable and covert
communication over a pure-loss channel to Bob is
impossible. Theorem 1 in the Methods demon-
strates that Willie can effectively use an ideal
single photon detector (SPD) on each mode to
discriminate between an n-mode vacuum state and
any non-vacuum state in Alice’s codebook. Willie
avoids false alarms since no photons impinge on
his SPD when Alice is silent. However, a single
click—detection of one or more photons—gives away
Alice’s transmission attempt regardless of the actual
quantum state of Alice’s signaling photons. Alice
is thus constrained to codewords that are nearly
indistinguishable from vacuum, rendering unreliable
any communication attempt that is designed to be
covert. Furthermore, any communication attempt
that is designed to be reliable cannot remain covert,
as Willie detects it with high probability for large n.
This is true even when Alice and Bob have access
to an infinitely-large pre-shared secret. Thus, if
Willie controlled the environment (as assumed in
QKD proofs), by setting it to vacuum, he could
deny covert communication between Alice and Bob.
However, a positive amount of non-adversarial
excess noise—whether from the thermal background
or the detector itself—is unavoidable, which enables
covert communication.
Channel noise yields the square root law—Now
consider the lossy bosonic channel E n¯Tηb , where
the environment mode is in a thermal state with
mean photon number n¯T > 0. A thermal state is
represented by a mixture of coherent states |α〉—
quantum descriptors of ideal laser-light—weighted
by a Gaussian distribution over the field amplitude
α ∈ C, ρˆEn¯T = 1πn¯T
∫
e−|α|
2/n¯T |α〉〈α|Ed2α. This
thermal noise masks Alice’s transmission attempt,
enabling covert communication even when Willie
has arbitrary resources, such as access to all
signaling photons not captured by Bob and any
quantum-limited measurement on the light he thus
captures. Theorem 2 in the Methods demonstrates
that in this scenario Alice can reliably transmit
O(√n) covert bits using n optical modes to Bob,
who needs only a conventional homodyne-detection
receiver. Alice achieves this using mean photon
number per mode n¯ = O(1/√n). Conversely,
Theorem 5 states that if Alice exceeds the limit of
O(√n) covert bits in n optical modes, transmission
either is detected or unreliable.
Detector noise also enables covert communication—
While any n¯T > 0 enables covert communication,
the number of covertly-transmitted bits decreases
with n¯T . Blackbody radiation is negligible at
optical frequencies (e.g., a typical daytime value of
n¯T ≈ 10−6 photons per mode at the optical telecom
wavelength of 1.55µm31). However, other sources
of excess noise can also hide the transmissions
(e.g. detector dark counts and Johnson noise). To
illustrate information-hiding capabilities of these
noise sources, we consider the (hypothetical) pure-
loss channel, for which Willie’s optimal receiver is
an ideal photon number resolving (PNR) detector
on each mode (as discussed in the Supplementary
Information). The prevalent form of excess noise
afflicting PNR detectors is the dark counts—
erroneous detection events stemming from internal
spontaneous emission processes. Thus, we consider
a pure-loss channel where Willie is equipped with
a PNR detector. Theorem 3 in the Methods
demonstrates that, using an on-off keying (OOK)
coherent state modulation where Alice transmits
the on symbol |α〉 with probability q = O(1/√n)
and the off symbol |0〉 with probability 1 − q, Alice
can reliably transmit O(√n) covert bits using n
OOK symbols.
4A structured strategy for covert communication—
The skewed on-off duty cycle of OOK modulation
makes construction of efficient ECCs challenging.
Constraining OOK signaling to Q-ary pulse position
modulation (PPM) addresses this issue by sacrific-
ing a constant fraction of throughput. Each PPM
symbol uses a PPM frame to transmit a sequence of
Q coherent state pulses, |0〉 . . . |α〉 . . . |0〉, encoding
message i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Q} by transmitting |α〉 in the
ith mode of the PPM frame. Thus, instead of O(n)
bits allowed by OOK, PPM lets O
(
n logQ
Q
)
bits be
transmitted in n optical modes. However, PPM per-
forms well in the low photon number regime32 and
the symmetry of its symbols enables the use of many
efficient ECCs.
To communicate covertly, Alice and Bob use a
fraction ζ = O
(√
Q/n
)
of n/Q available PPM
frames on average, effectively using n¯ = O(1/√n)
photons per mode. By keeping secret which frames
they use, Alice and Bob force Willie to examine all
of them, increasing the likelihood of dark counts.
An ECC that is known by Willie ensures reliabil-
ity. However, the transmitted pulse positions are
scrambled within the corresponding PPM frames via
an operation resembling one-time pad encryption6,
preventing Willie’s exploitation of the ECC’s struc-
ture for detection (rather than protecting the mes-
sage content). Theorem 4 demonstrates that, using
this scheme, Alice reliably transmits O
(√
n
Q logQ
)
covert bits at the cost of pre-sharing O
(√
n
Q logn
)
secret bits.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Objective and design—To demonstrate the square-
root law of covert optical communication we realized
a proof-of-concept test-bed implementation. Alice
and Bob engage in an n-mode communication
session consisting of n/Q Q-ary PPM frames,
Q = 32. As described in the Methods, Alice trans-
mits ζn/Q PPM symbols on average, using a first
order Reed-Solomon (RS) code for error correction.
RS codes perform well on channels dominated by
erasures, which occur in low received-power scenar-
ios, e.g., covert and deep space communication33.
We defer the specifics of the generation of the
transmitted signal to the Methods. We varied n
from 3.2×106 to 3.2×107 in several communication
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FIG. 2. Experimental setup. A National Instruments
PCIe-6537 data acquisition card (DAQ), driven by a 1
MHz clock, controlled the experiment, generating trans-
missions and reading detection events. Alice generated
1 ns optical pulses using a temperature-stabilized laser
diode with center wavelength 1550.2 nm. The pulses
were sent into a free-space optical channel, where a
half-wave plate (HWP) and polarizing beamsplitter cube
(PBSC) sent a fraction ηb of light to Bob, and the re-
maining light to Willie. Bob and Willie’s receivers op-
erated InGaAs Geiger-mode avalanche photodiode SPDs
that were gated with 1 ns reverse bias triggered to match
the arrival of Alice’s pulses.
TABLE I. Optical channel characteristics
Willie Bob
Experimental
observations
p
(w)
D n¯
(w)
det
p
(b)
D n¯
(b)
det
ζ = 0.25
√
Q/n 9.15 × 10−5 0.036 2.99× 10−6 1.52
ζ = 0.03 4
√
Q/n 9.11 × 10−5 0.032 2.55× 10−6 1.14
ζ = 0.003 9.29 × 10−5 0.032 2.65× 10−6 1.07
ζ = 0.008 9.27 × 10−5 0.028 2.68× 10−6 1.05
Target: 9× 10−5 0.03 3× 10−6 1.4
regimes: “careful Alice” (ζ = 0.25
√
Q/n), “careless
Alice” (ζ = 0.03 4
√
Q/n), and “dangerously careless
Alice” (ζ = 0.003 and ζ = 0.008). For each (n, ζ)
pair we conducted 100 experiments and 105 Monte-
Carlo simulations, measuring Bob’s total number of
bits received and Willie’s detection error probability.
Implementation—The experiment was conducted
using a mixture of fiber-based and free-space optical
elements implementing channels from Alice to both
Bob and Willie (see Figure 2 for a schematic). Due
to the low intensity of Alice’s pulses, direct detection
using single photon detectors (SPDs), rather than
PNR receivers, was sufficient. Several configurations
were considered for implementing the background
noise at the receivers. We provided noise only during
the gating period of the detectors since continuous
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FIG. 3. Bits decoded by Bob. Each data point is an aver-
age from 100 experiments, with negligibly small 95% con-
fidence intervals. The symbol error rates are: 1.1× 10−4
for ζ = 0.25
√
Q/n, 8.3 × 10−3 for ζ = 0.03/ 4
√
Q/n,
4.5×10−3 for ζ = 0.003, and 1.8×10−2 for ζ = 0.008. We
also report the maximum throughput Csζn
Q
computed in
the Methods using the experimentally-observed values
from Table I, where Cs is the per-symbol Shannon ca-
pacity34. Given the low observed symbol error rate for
ζ = 0.25
√
Q/n, we note that a square root scaling is
achievable even using a relatively short RS code; Fig-
ure 4 demonstrates that this is achieved covertly.
wave light irradiating Geiger-mode avalanche pho-
todiodes (APDs) suppresses detection efficiency35.
Instead of providing extraneous optical pulses dur-
ing the gating window of the APD, we emulated
optical noise at the detectors by increasing the de-
tector gate voltage, thus increasing the detector’s
dark click probability. While the APD dark counts
are Poisson-distributed with mean rate n¯N photons
per mode, when n¯N ≪ 1, the dark click probabil-
ity 1 − e−n¯N is close to n¯N1+n¯N , the probability that
an incoherent thermal background with mean pho-
ton number per mode n¯N produces a click. In Ta-
ble I we report the experimentally-observed and tar-
geted values of dark click probabilities p
(b)
D and p
(w)
D
of Bob’s and Willie’s detectors, as well as the mean
number of photons detected by Bob n¯
(b)
det
= ηbη
(b)
QEn¯
and Willie n¯
(w)
det
= (1 − ηb)η(w)QE n¯, where n¯ = 5 is the
mean photon number of Alice’s pulses, ηb = 0.97 is
the fraction of light sent to Bob, and η
(b)
QE and η
(w)
QE
are the quantum efficiencies of Bob’s and Willie’s de-
tectors, which we do not explicitly calculate. How-
ever, quantum efficiency is strongly correlated with
the detector’s dark click probability36.
The amount of transmitted information, with
other parameters fixed, is proportional to n¯
(b)
det
/n¯
(w)
det
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FIG. 4. Willie’s error probability. Estimates from 100
experiments have solid fill; estimates from 105 Monte-
Carlo simulations have clear fill; and Gaussian approx-
imations are lines. The 95% confidence intervals (com-
puted in the Methods) for the experimental estimates
are ±0.136; for the Monte-Carlo simulations they are
±0.014. Alice transmits ζn/Q PPM symbols on average
and Willie’s error probability remains constant when Al-
ice obeys the square root law and uses ζ = O(
√
Q/n); it
drops as n increases if Alice breaks the square root law
by using an asymptotically larger ζ.
Our choice of n¯
(b)
det
≫ n¯(w)
det
allowed the experiment
to gather a statistically meaningful data sample
in a reasonable duration. In an operational free-
space laser communication system, a directional
transmitter will likely yield just such an asymmetry
in coupling between Bob and Willie; however,
we note that the only fundamental requirement
for implementing information-theoretically secure
covert communication is p
(w)
D > 0, or n¯T > 0.
Results—Alice and Bob use a (31, 15) RS code. Fig-
ure 3 reports the number of bits received by Bob
with the corresponding symbol error rate in our ex-
periments, and his maximum throughput from Alice
(calculated for each regime using the experimentally-
observed values from Table I). The details of our
analysis are in the Methods. Our relatively short
RS code achieves between 45% and 60% of the max-
imum throughput in the “careful Alice” regime and
between 55% and 75% of the maximum in other
regimes at reasonable error rates, showing that even
a basic code demonstrates our theoretical scaling.
Willie’s detection problem can be reduced to a
test between two simple hypotheses where the log-
likelihood ratio test minimizes P
(w)
e
37. Figure 4 re-
ports Willie’s probability of error estimated from
6the experiments and the Monte-Carlo study, as well
as its analytical Gaussian approximation, with the
implementation details deferred to the Methods.
Monte-Carlo simulations show that the Gaussian ap-
proximation is accurate. More importantly, Figure 4
highlights Alice’s safety when she obeys the square
root law and her peril when she does not. When
ζ = O(1/√n), P(w)e remains constant as n increases.
However, for asymptotically larger ζ, P
(w)
e drops at a
rate that depends on Alice’s carelessness. The drop
at ζ = 0.008 vividly demonstrates our converse.
DISCUSSION
We determined that covert communication is
achievable provided that the adversary’s measure-
ment is subject to non-adversarial excess noise. Ex-
cess noise is crucial, as pure loss alone does not al-
low covert communication, starkly contrasting the
QKD scenario. However, the existence of excess
noise in practical systems (e.g., blackbody radia-
tion and dark counts) allows covert communication,
as demonstrated for the first time in our proof-of-
concept optical covert communication system. Even
though our results are for an optical channel, they
are relevant to RF communication due to the re-
cent advances in quantum-noise-limited microwave-
frequency amplifiers and detectors38. Finally, our
work provides a significant impetus towards the
development of covert optical networks, eventually
scaling privacy to large interconnected systems.
METHODS
Covert Optical Communication Theorems
Here we state our theorems, with proofs deferred
to the Supplementary Information. Each theorem
can be classified as either an “achievability” or a
“converse”. Achievability theorems (2, 3, and 4) es-
tablish the lower limit on the amount of information
that can be covertly transmitted from Alice to Bob,
while the converse theorems (1 and 5) demonstrate
the upper limit. In essence, the achievability results
are obtained by
1. fixing Alice’s and Bob’s communication sys-
tem, revealing its construction in entirety (ex-
cept the shared secret) to Willie;
2. showing that, even with such information, any
detector Willie can choose within some natu-
ral constraints is ineffective at discriminating
Alice’s transmission state; and
3. demonstrating that the transmission can be re-
liably decoded by Bob using the shared secret.
On the other hand, converses are established by
1. fixing Willie’s detection scheme (and revealing
it to Alice and Bob); and
2. demonstrating that no amount of resources al-
lows Alice to both remain undetected by Willie
and exceed the upper limit on the amount
of information that is reliably transmitted to
Bob.
We start by claiming the inability to instantiate
covert communication in the absence of excess noise.
Theorem 1 (Insufficiency of pure-loss for covert
communication) Suppose Willie has a pure-loss
channel from Alice and is limited only by the
laws of physics in his receiver measurement choice.
Then Alice cannot communicate to Bob reliably and
covertly even if Alice and Bob have access to a pre-
shared secret of unbounded size, an unattenuated
observation of the transmission, and a quantum-
optimal receiver.
Next we claim the achievability of the square root
law when Willie’s channel is subject to excess noise.
We first consider a lossy optical channel with ad-
ditive thermal noise, and claim achievability even
when Willie has arbitrary resources such as any
quantum-limited measurement on the isometric ex-
tension of the Alice-to-Bob quantum channel (i.e.,
access to all signaling photons not captured by Bob).
Theorem 2 (Square root law for the thermal noise
channel) Suppose Willie has access to an arbitrarily
complex receiver measurement as permitted by the
laws of quantum physics and can capture all the pho-
tons transmitted by Alice that do not reach Bob. Let
Willie’s channel from Alice be subject to noise from
a thermal environment that injects n¯T > 0 photons
per optical mode on average, and let Alice and Bob
share a secret of sufficient length before communicat-
ing. Then Alice can lower-bound Willie’s detection
error probability P
(w)
e ≥ 12 − ǫ for any ǫ > 0 while
reliably transmitting O(√n) bits to Bob in n optical
modes even if Bob only has access to a (sub-optimal)
coherent detection receiver, such as an optical homo-
dyne detector.
7In the remaining theorems Willie’s detector is a
noisy photon number resolving (PNR) receiver. An
ideal PNR receiver is an asymptotically optimal de-
tector for Willie in the pure-loss regime (as discussed
in the remark following the proof of Theorem 1 in the
Supplementary Information). However, any practi-
cal implementation of a PNR receiver has a non-zero
dark current. Theorems 3 and 4 show that noise
from the resulting dark counts enables covert com-
munication even over a pure-loss channel. We model
the dark counts per mode in Willie’s PNR detector
as a Poisson process with average number of dark
counts per mode λw.
Theorem 3 (Dark counts yield square root law)
Suppose that Willie has a pure-loss channel from Al-
ice, captures all photons transmitted by Alice that
do not reach Bob, but is limited to a receiver with
a non-zero dark current. Let Alice and Bob share
a secret of sufficient length before communicating.
Then Alice can lower-bound Willie’s detection error
probability P
(w)
e ≥ 12 − ǫ for any ǫ > 0 while reliably
transmitting O(√n) bits to Bob in n optical modes.
The proof of Theorem 3 demonstrates thatO(√n)
covert bits can be reliably transmitted using be on-
off keying (OOK) coherent state modulation where
Alice transmits the on symbol |α〉 with probability
q = O(1/√n) and the off symbol |0〉 with probability
1−q. However, the skewed on-off duty cycle of OOK
modulation makes construction of efficient error cor-
rection codes (ECCs) challenging. We thus consider
pulse position modulation (PPM) which constrains
the OOK signaling scheme, enabling the use of many
efficient ECCs by sacrificing a constant fraction of
throughput. Each PPM symbol uses a PPM frame
to transmit a sequence of Q coherent state pulses,
|0〉 . . . |α〉 . . . |0〉, encoding message i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Q}
by transmitting |α〉 in the ith mode of the PPM
frame. Next we claim that the square root scaling is
achievable under this structural constraint.
Theorem 4 (Dark counts yield square root law un-
der structured modulation) Suppose that Willie has
a pure-loss channel from Alice, can capture all pho-
tons transmitted by Alice that do not reach Bob,
but is limited to a PNR receiver with a non-zero
dark current. Let Alice and Bob share a secret of
sufficient length before communicating. Then Alice
can lower-bound Willie’s detection error probability
P
(w)
e ≥ 12−ǫ for any ǫ > 0 while reliably transmitting
O(
√
n
Q logQ) bits to Bob using n optical modes and
a Q-ary PPM constellation.
Finally, we claim the unsurmountability of the
square root law. We assume non-zero thermal noise
(n¯T > 0) in the channel and non-zero dark count
rate (λw > 0) in Willie’s detector. Setting λw = 0
yields the converse for Theorem 2, and setting n¯T =
0 yields the converse for Theorems 3 and 4 Setting
λw = 0 and n¯T = 0 yields the conditions for The-
orem 1. To state the theorem, we use the follow-
ing asymptotic notation39: we say f(n) = ω(g(n))
when g(n) is a lower bound that is not asymptoti-
cally tight.
Theorem 5 (Converse of the square root law) Sup-
pose Alice only uses n-mode codewords with total
photon number variance σ2x = O(n). Then, if she
attempts to transmit ω(
√
n) bits in n modes, as
n → ∞, she is either detected by Willie with arbi-
trarily low detection error probability, or Bob cannot
decode with arbitrarily low decoding error probability.
The restriction on the photon number variance of
Alice’s input states is not onerous since it subsumes
all well-known quantum states of a bosonic mode.
However, proving this theorem for input states with
unbounded photon number variance per mode re-
mains an open problem.
Next we provide details of the experimental
methodology.
Experimental methodology
Alice’s encoder
Prior to communication, Alice and Bob secretly
select a random subset S of PPM frames to use for
transmission: each of the n/Q available PPM frames
is selected independently with probability ζ. Alice
and Bob then secretly generate a vector k contain-
ing |S| numbers selected independently uniformly at
random from {0, 1, . . . , Q − 1}, where |S| denotes
the cardinality of S. Alice encodes a message into
a codeword of size |S| using a Reed-Solomon (RS)
code. She adds k modulo Q to this message and
transmits it on the PPM frames in S. We note that
this is almost identical to the construction of the
coding scheme in the proof of Theorem 4 (see the
Supplementary Information), with the exception of
the use of an RS code for error correction.
8Generation of transmitted symbols
Alice generates the length-n binary sequence de-
scribing the transmitted signal, with a “1” at a given
location indicating a pulse in that mode, and a “0”
indicating the absence of a pulse. First, Alice en-
codes random data, organized into Q-ary symbols,
with an RS code and modulo-Q addition of k to pro-
duce a coded sequence of Q-ary symbols. The value
of the ith symbol in this sequence indicates which
mode in the ith PPM symbol in the set S contains a
pulse, whereas all modes of the PPM frames not in
S remain empty. Mapping occupied modes to “1”
and unoccupied modes to “0” results in the desired
length-n binary sequence.
To accurately estimate Willie’s detection error
probability in the face of optical power fluctuations,
the length-n binary sequence from above is alter-
nated with a length-n sequence of all “0”s, to pro-
duce the final length-2n sequence that is passed to
the experimental setup. Willie gets a “clean” look
at the channel when Alice is silent using these in-
terleaved “0”s, thus allowing the estimation of both
the false alarm and the missed detection probabili-
ties under the same conditions. Bob simply discards
the interleaved “0”s.
Bob’s decoder
Bob examines only the PPM frames in S. If two
or more pulses are detected in a PPM frame, one of
them is selected uniformly at random. If no pulses
are detected, it is labeled as an erasure. After sub-
tracting k modulo Q from this vector of PPM sym-
bols (subtraction is not performed on erasures), the
resultant vector is passed to the RS decoder.
For each experiment we record the total number
of bits in the successfully-decoded codewords; the
undecoded codewords are discarded. For each pair
of parameters (ζ, n) we report the mean of the to-
tal number of decoded bits over 100 experiments.
The reported symbol error rate is the total num-
ber of lost data symbols during all the experiments
at the specified communication regime divided by
the total number of data symbols transmitted during
these experiments. The calculation of the theoretical
channel capacity is presented in the Supplementary
Information.
Willie’s detector
Estimation of P
(w)
e —The test statistic for the log-
likelihood ratio test is defined as:
L = log
f1(xw)
f0(xw)
=
n/Q∑
i=1
log
[
1 + ζp(w)r
(
y
(w)
i
Qp
(w)
D
− 1
)]
,
(1)
where f0(xw) and f1(xw) are the likelihood func-
tions of the click record xw corresponding to Alice
being quiet and transmitting, y
(w)
i is the number
of clicks Willie observes in the ith PPM frame, and
p
(w)
r = 1 − e−ηwn¯ is the probability of Willie ob-
serving a click stemming from Alice’s transmission.
Equation (1) is derived in the Supplementary Infor-
mation. Willie calculates L using equation (1) and
compares it to a threshold S, accusing Alice if L ≥ S.
Willie chooses the value of S that minimizes Willie’s
detection error probability P
(w)
e .
For each pair of parameters (n, ζ) as well as
Alice’s transmission state, we perform m experi-
ments, obtaining a sample vector yw from each ex-
periment and calculating the log-likelihood ratio L
using (1). We denote by L(0) = [L
(0)
1 , . . . , L
(0)
m ]
and L(1) = [L
(1)
1 , . . . , L
(1)
m ] the vectors of ex-
perimentally observed log-likelihood ratios when
Alice does not transmit and transmits, respec-
tively. To estimate Willie’s probability of er-
ror P
(w)
e , we construct empirical distribution func-
tions Fˆ
(0)
m (x) =
1
n
∑m
i=1 1L(0)i ≤x
(x) and Fˆ
(1)
m (x) =
1
m
∑m
i=1 1L(1)i ≤x
(x), where 1A(x) =
{
1 if x ∈ A
0 if x /∈ A
denotes the indicator function. The estimated prob-
ability of error is then
Pˆ
(w)
e =
1
2
min
S
(1 − Fˆ (0)m (S) + Fˆ (1)m (S)). (2)
Monte-Carlo simulation and Gaussian approxima-
tion—We perform a Monte-Carlo study using 105
simulations per (n, ζ) pair. We generate, encode,
and detect the messages as in the physical exper-
iment, and use equation (2) to estimate Willie’s
probability of error, but simulate the optical channel
induced by our choice of a laser-light transmitter
and an SPD using its measured characteristics
reported in Table I. Similarly, we use the values in
Table I for our analytical Gaussian approximation
of P
(w)
e described in the Supplementary Information.
9Confidence intervals—We compute the confidence
intervals for the estimate in equation (2) using
Dvoretzky-Keifer-Wolfowitz inequality40,41, which
relates the distribution function FX(x) of random
variable X to the empirical distribution function
Fˆm(x) =
1
m
∑m
i=1 1Xi≤x(x) associated with a se-
quence {Xi}mi=1 ofm i.i.d. draws of the random vari-
able X as follows:
P(sup
x
|Fˆm(x)− FX(x)| > ξ) ≤ 2e−2mξ2, (3)
where ξ > 0. For x0, the (1 − α) confidence in-
terval for the empirical estimate of F (x0) is given
by [max{Fˆm(x0) − ξ, 0},min{Fˆm(x0) + ξ, 1}] where
ξ =
√
log(2/α)
2m . Thus, ±ξ is used for reporting the
confidence intervals in Figure 4.
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
I. COVERT OPTICAL COMMUNICATION THEOREMS
Here we re-state the theorems from the main paper and provide their proofs.
Theorem 1 (Insufficiency of pure-loss for covert communication) Suppose Willie has a pure-loss channel
from Alice and is limited only by the laws of physics in his receiver measurement choice. Then Alice cannot
communicate to Bob reliably and covertly even if Alice and Bob have access to a pre-shared secret of unbounded
size, an unattenuated observation of the transmission, and a quantum-optimal receiver.
In the proof of this theorem we denote a tensor product of n Fock (or photon number) states by |u〉 ≡
|u1〉 ⊗ |u2〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |un〉, where vector u ∈ Nn0 and N0 is the set of non-negative integers. Specifically,
|0〉 ≡ |0〉⊗n. Before proceeding with the proof, we prove the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Given the input of n-mode vacuum state |0〉En on the “environment” port and an n-mode en-
tangled state |ψ〉An = ∑
k
ak |k〉A
n
on the “Alice” port of a beamsplitter with transmissivity ηb = 1 − ηw,
the diagonal elements of the output state ρW
n
on the “Willie” port can be expressed in the n-fold Fock state
basis as follows:
Wn〈s| ρˆWn |s〉Wn =
∑
k∈Nn0
|ak|2
n∏
i=1
(
ki
si
)
(1− ηw)ki−siηsiw . (S1)
Proof. A beamsplitter can be described as a unitary transformation UBS from the two input modes (Alice’s
and the environment’s ports) to the two output modes (Bob’s and Willie’s ports). Given a Fock state input
|t〉A on Alice’s port and vacuum input |0〉E on the environment’s port, the output at Bob’s and Willie’s
ports is described as follows44 (Section IV.D):
UBS |t〉A |0〉E =
t∑
m=0
√(
t
m
)
ηmw (1 − ηw)t−m |m〉W |t−m〉B .
Thus,
U⊗nBS |t〉A
n |0〉En =
n⊗
i=1
ti∑
mi=0
√(
ti
mi
)
ηmiw (1− ηw)ti−mi |mi〉Wi |ti −mi〉Bi ,
which implies
U⊗nBS |ψ〉A
n |0〉En =
∑
t∈Nn0
at
n⊗
i=1
ti∑
mi=0
√(
ti
mi
)
ηmiw (1− ηw)ti−mi |mi〉Wi |ti −mi〉Bi ≡ |φ〉W
nBn
.
Now, the partial trace of the output state ρBW = |φ〉WnBn over Bob’s system reveals Willie’s output state:
ρW
n
= TrBn
[
|φ〉WnBn WnBn〈φ|
]
=
∑
x∈Nn0
∣∣∣Bn〈x|φ〉WnBn ∣∣∣2 ,
with
Bn〈x|φ〉WnBn =
∑
t∈Nn0
at
n⊗
i=1
ti∑
mi=0
√(
ti
mi
)
ηmiw (1− ηw)ti−mi |mi〉Wi Bi〈xi|ti −mi〉Bi
=
∑
t∈Nn0
at
n⊗
i=1
√(
ti
xi
)
ηti−xiw (1 − ηw)xi |ti − xi〉Wi , (S2)
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where equation (S2) is due to the orthogonality of the Fock states. Thus,
Wn〈s| ρˆWn |s〉Wn =
∑
x∈Nn0
∣∣∣Wn〈s|Bn〈x|φ〉WnBn ∣∣∣2 , (S3)
where
Wn〈s|Bn〈x|φ〉WnBn =
∑
t∈Nn0
at
n∏
i=1
√(
ti
xi
)
ηti−xiw (1− ηw)xiδsi,ti−xi
= ax+s
n∏
i=1
√(
xi + si
xi
)
ηsiw (1− ηw)xi , (S4)
with δa,b =
{
1 if a = b
0 otherwise
. Substituting k = x+ s into equation (S4) and substituting the right-hand side
(RHS) of (S4) into equation (S3) yields
Wn〈s| ρˆWn |s〉Wn =
∑
k∈Nn0
∣∣∣∣∣ak
n∏
i=1
√(
ki
si
)
ηsiw (1− ηw)ki−si
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
∑
k∈Nn0
|ak|2
n∏
i=1
(
ki
si
)
ηsiw (1 − ηw)ki−si (S5)
where equation (S5) is due to ηw ∈ [0, 1).
Proof. (Theorem 1) Alice sends one of 2M (equally likely) M -bit messages by choosing an element from an
arbitrary codebook {ρˆAnx , x = 1, . . . , 2M}, where a state ρˆA
n
x = |ψx〉A
nAn〈ψx| encodes an M -bit message Wx.
|ψx〉A
n
=
∑
k∈Nn0 ak(x) |k〉
An
is a general n-mode pure state, where |k〉 ≡ |k1〉 ⊗ |k2〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |kn〉 is a tensor
product of n Fock states. We limit our analysis to pure input states since, by convexity, using mixed states
as inputs can only degrade the performance (since that is equivalent to transmitting a randomly chosen pure
state from an ensemble and discarding the knowledge of that choice).
Let Willie use an ideal SPD on all n modes, given by positive operator-valued measure (POVM){
|0〉 〈0| ,∑∞j=1 |j〉 〈j|}⊗n. When Wu is transmitted, Willie’s hypothesis test reduces to discriminating be-
tween the states
ρˆW
n
0 = |0〉W
nWn〈0| and (S6)
ρˆW
n
1 = ρˆ
Wn
u , (S7)
where ρˆW
n
u is the output state of a pure-loss channel with transmissivity ηw corresponding to an input state
ρˆA
n
u . Thus, Willie’s average error probability is:
P
(w)
e =
1
2M+1
2M∑
u=1
Wn〈0| ρˆWnu |0〉W
n
, (S8)
since messages are sent equiprobably. Note that the error is entirely due to missed codeword detections, as
Willie’s receiver never raises a false alarm. By Lemma 2,
Wn〈0| ρˆWu |0〉W
n
=
∑
k∈Nn0
|ak(u)|2 (1− ηw)
∑n
i=1 ki
≤ |a0(u)|2 + (1− |a0(u)|2)(1 − ηw)
= 1− ηw
(
1− |a0(u)|2
)
. (S9)
13
Substituting equation (S9) into equation (S8) yields:
P
(w)
e ≤
1
2
− ηw
2

1− 1
2M
2M∑
u=1
|a0(u)|2

 .
Thus, to ensure P
(w)
e ≥ 12 − ǫ, Alice must use a codebook with the probability of transmitting zero photons:
1
2M
2M∑
u=1
|a0(u)|2 ≥ 1− 2ǫ
ηw
. (S10)
Equation (S10) can be restated as an upper bound on the probability of transmitting one or more photons:
1
2M
2M∑
u=1
(
1− |a0(u)|2
)
≤ 2ǫ
ηw
. (S11)
Now we show that there exists an interval (0, ǫ0], ǫ0 > 0 such that if ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ0], Bob’s average decoding error
probability P
(b)
e ≥ δ0 where δ0 > 0, thus making covert communication over a pure-loss channel unreliable.
Denote by Eu→v the event that the transmitted message Wu is decoded by Bob as Wv 6=Wu. Given that
Wu is transmitted, the decoding error probability is the probability of the union of events ∪2Mv=0,v 6=uEu→v.
Let Bob choose a POVM {Λ∗j} that minimizes the average probability of error over n optical channel modes:
P
(b)
e = inf{Λj}
1
2M
2M∑
u=1
P
(
∪2Mv=0,v 6=uEu→v
)
. (S12)
Now consider a codebook that meets the necessary condition for covert communication given in equation
(S11). Define the subset of this codebook
{
ρˆA
n
u , u ∈ A
}
whereA =
{
u : 1− |a0(u)|2 ≤ 4ǫηw
}
. We lower-bound
(S12) as follows:
P
(b)
e =
1
2M
∑
u∈A¯
P
(
∪2Mv=0,v 6=uEu→v
)
+
1
2M
∑
u∈A
P
(
∪2Mv=0,v 6=uEu→v
)
(S13)
≥ 1
2M
∑
u∈A
P
(
∪2Mv=0,v 6=uEu→v
)
, (S14)
where the probabilities in equation (S13) are with respect to the POVM {Λ∗j} that minimizes equation (S12)
over the entire codebook. Without loss of generality, let’s assume that |A| is even, and split A into two equal-
sized subsets A(left) andA(right) (formally, A(left)∪A(right) = A, A(left)∩A(right) = ∅, and |A(left)| = |A(right)|).
Let g : A(left) → A(right) be a bijection. We can thus re-write (S14):
P
(b)
e ≥
1
2M
∑
u∈A(left)
2

P
(
∪2Mv=0,v 6=uEu→v
)
2
+
P
(
∪2Mv=0,v 6=g(u)Eg(u)→v
)
2


≥ 1
2M
∑
u∈A(left)
2
(
P
(
Eu→g(u)
)
2
+
P
(
Eg(u)→u
)
2
)
, (S15)
where the second lower bound is due to the events Eu→g(u) and Eg(u)→u being contained in the unions
∪2Mv=0,v 6=uEu→v and ∪2
M
v=0,v 6=g(u)Eg(u)→v, respectively. The summation term in equation (S15),
Pe(u) ≡
P
(
Eu→g(u)
)
2
+
P
(
Eg(u)→u
)
2
, (S16)
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is Bob’s average probability of error when Alice only sends messages Wu and Wg(u) equiprobably. We thus
reduce the analytically intractable problem of discriminating between many states in equation (S12) to a
quantum binary hypothesis test.
The lower bound on the probability of error in discriminating two received codewords is obtained by lower-
bounding the probability of error in discriminating two codewords before they are sent (this is equivalent to
Bob having an unattenuated unity-transmissivity channel from Alice). Recalling that ρˆA
n
u = |ψu〉A
nAn〈ψu|
and ρˆA
n
g(u) =
∣∣ψg(u)〉AnAn〈ψg(u)∣∣ are pure states, the lower bound on the probability of error in discriminating
between
∣∣ψAnu 〉 and ∣∣∣ψAng(u)〉 is42 (Chapter IV.2 (c), Equation (2.34)):
Pe(u) ≥
[
1−
√
1− F
(
|ψu〉An ,
∣∣ψg(u)〉An)
]/
2 , (S17)
where F (|ψ〉 , |φ〉) = | 〈ψ|φ〉 |2 is the fidelity between the pure states |ψ〉 and |φ〉. Lower-bounding
F
(
|ψu〉A
n
,
∣∣ψg(u)〉An) lower-bounds the RHS of equation (S17). For pure states |ψ〉 and |φ〉, F (|ψ〉 , |φ〉) =
1− ( 12‖ |ψ〉 〈ψ| − |φ〉 〈φ| ‖1)2, where ‖ρ− σ‖1 is the trace distance45 (Equation (9.134)). Thus,
F
(
|ψu〉A
n
,
∣∣ψg(u)〉An) = 1−
(
1
2
‖ρˆAnu − ρˆA
n
g(u)‖1
)2
≥ 1−
(
‖ρˆAnu − |0〉A
nAn〈0| ‖1
2
+
‖ρˆAng(u) − |0〉A
nAn〈0| ‖1
2
)2
= 1−
(√
1−
∣∣∣An〈0|ψu〉An ∣∣∣2 +
√
1−
∣∣∣An〈0|ψg(u)〉An ∣∣∣2
)2
, (S18)
where the inequality is due to the triangle inequality for trace distance. Substituting (S18) into (S17) yields:
Pe(u) ≥
[
1−
√
1−
∣∣∣An〈0|ψu〉An ∣∣∣2 −
√
1−
∣∣∣An〈0|ψg(u)〉An∣∣∣2
]/
2 . (S19)
Since
∣∣∣An〈0|ψu〉An ∣∣∣2 = |a0(u)|2 and, by the construction of A, 1 − |a0(u)|2 ≤ 4ǫηw and 1 − |a0(g(u))|2 ≤ 4ǫηw ,
we have:
Pe(u) ≥ 1
2
− 2
√
ǫ
ηw
. (S20)
Recalling the definition of Pe(u) in equation (S16), we substitute (S20) into (S15) to obtain:
P
(b)
e ≥
|A|
2M
(
1
2
− 2
√
ǫ
ηw
)
, (S21)
Now, re-stating the condition for covert communication (S11) yields:
2ǫ
ηw
≥ 1
2M
∑
u∈A
(
1− |a0(u)|2
)
≥
(
2M − |A|)
2M
4ǫ
ηw
(S22)
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with equality (S22) due to 1 − |a0(u)|2 > 4ǫηw for all codewords in A by the construction of A. Solving
inequality in (S22) for |A|2M yields the lower bound on the fraction of the codewords in A,
|A|
2M
≥ 1
2
. (S23)
Combining equations (S21) and (S23) results in a positive lower bound on Bob’s probability of decoding
error P
(b)
e ≥ 14 −
√
ǫ
ηw
for ǫ ∈ (0, ηw16 ] and any n, and demonstrates that reliable covert communication over
a pure-loss channel is impossible.
Remark—The minimum probability of discrimination error between the states given by equations (S6) and
(S7) satisfies46 (Section III):
1−
√
1−Wn〈0| ρˆWnu |0〉W
n
2
≤ minP(w)e ≤
1
2
Wn〈0| ρˆWnu |0〉W
n
.
Since
Wn〈0|ρˆWnu |0〉W
n
4 ≤
1−
√
1−Wn〈0|ρˆWnu |0〉W
n
2 , the error probability for the SPD is at most twice that of
an optimal discriminator. Thus, the SPD is an asymptotically optimal detector when the channel from
Alice is pure-loss. Since the photon number resolving (PNR) receiver, given by the POVM elements
{|0〉 〈0| , |1〉 〈1| , |2〉 〈2| , . . .}⊗n, could be used to mimic the SPD with the detection event threshold set at
one photon, the PNR receiver is also asymptotically optimal in this scenario.
Theorem 3 (Square root law for the thermal noise channel) Suppose Willie has access to an arbitrarily
complex receiver measurement as permitted by the laws of quantum physics and can capture all the photons
transmitted by Alice that do not reach Bob. Let Willie’s channel from Alice be subject to noise from a thermal
environment that injects n¯T > 0 photons per optical mode on average, and let Alice and Bob share a secret
of sufficient length before communicating. Then Alice can lower-bound Willie’s detection error probability
P
(w)
e ≥ 12 − ǫ for any ǫ > 0 while reliably transmitting O(
√
n) bits to Bob in n optical modes even if Bob only
has access to a (sub-optimal) coherent detection receiver, such as an optical homodyne detector.
First, we define quantum relative entropy and prove a lemma:
Definition 4 Quantum relative entropy between states ρˆ0 and ρˆ1 is D(ρˆ0‖ρˆ1) ≡ Tr{ρˆ0(ln ρˆ0 − ln ρˆ1)}.
Lemma 5 (Quantum relative entropy between two thermal states) If ρˆ0=
∑∞
n=0
n¯n0
(1+n¯0)1+n
|n〉〈n|
and ρˆ1=
∑∞
n=0
n¯n1
(1+n¯1)1+n
|n〉〈n|, then D(ρˆ0‖ρˆ1)= n¯0 ln n¯0(1+n¯1)n¯1(1+n¯0) + ln 1+n¯11+n¯0
Proof. Express D(ρˆ0‖ρˆ1) = −Tr{ρˆ0(ln ρˆ1)} − S(ρˆ0), where S(ρˆ0) ≡ −Tr[ρˆ0 ln ρˆ0] is the von Neumann
entropy of the state ρˆ0:
S(ρˆ0) = ln(1 + n¯0) + n¯0 ln
(
1 +
1
n¯0
)
. (S24)
Now,
Tr[ρˆ0 ln ρˆ1] = Tr
[( ∞∑
n=0
n¯n0
(1 + n¯0)1+n
|n〉 〈n|
)( ∞∑
n=0
ln
n¯n1
(1 + n¯1)1+n
|n〉 〈n|
)]
=
∞∑
n=0
n¯n0
(1 + n¯0)1+n
ln
n¯n1
(1 + n¯1)1+n
=
1
1 + n¯0
ln
1
1 + n¯1
∞∑
n=0
(
n¯0
1 + n¯0
)n
+ ln
n¯1
1 + n¯1
∞∑
n=0
n
1 + n¯0
·
(
n¯0
1 + n¯0
)n
= ln
1
1 + n¯1
+ n¯0 ln
n¯1
1 + n¯1
(S25)
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where (S25) is due to the geometric series
∑∞
n=0
(
n¯0
1+n¯0
)n
=
(
1− n¯01+n¯0
)−1
and
∑∞
n=0
n
1+n¯0
(
n¯0
1+n¯0
)n
=
n¯0 being the expression for the mean of geometrically-distributed random variable X ∼ Geom
(
1
1+n¯0
)
.
Combining (S24) and (S25) yields the lemma.
Proof. (Theorem 3) Construction: Let Alice use a zero-mean isotropic Gaussian-distributed coherent
state input {p(α), |α〉}, where α ∈ C, p(α) = e−|α|2/n¯/πn¯ with mean photon number per symbol n¯ =∫
C
|α|2p(α)d2α. Alice encodes M -bit blocks of input into codewords of length n symbols by generating 2M
codewords {⊗ni=1 |αi〉k}2Mk=1, each according to p(⊗ni=1 |αi〉) = ∏ni=1 p(αi), where ⊗ni=1 |αi〉 = |α1 . . . αn〉 is
an n-mode tensor-product coherent state. The codebook is used only once to send a single message and is
kept secret from Willie, though he knows how it is constructed.
Analysis (Willie): Since Willie does not have access to Alice’s codebook, Willie has to discriminate between
the following n-copy quantum states:
ρˆ⊗n0 =
( ∞∑
i=0
(ηbn¯T )
i
(1 + ηbn¯T )1+i
|i〉 〈i|
)⊗n
, and
ρˆ⊗n1 =
( ∞∑
i=0
(ηwn¯+ ηbn¯T )
i
(1 + ηwn¯+ η(n)n¯T )1+i
|i〉 〈i|
)⊗n
.
Willie’s average probability of error in discriminating between ρˆ⊗n0 and ρˆ
⊗n
1 is
45 (Section 9.1.4):
P
(w)
e ≥
1
2
[
1− 1
2
‖ρˆ⊗n1 − ρˆ⊗n0 ‖1
]
,
where the minimum in this case is attained by a PNR detection. The trace distance ‖ρˆ0 − ρˆ1‖1 between
states ρˆ1 and ρˆ1 is upper-bounded the quantum relative entropy (QRE) using quantum Pinsker’s Inequality
45
(Theorem 11.9.2) as follows:
‖ρˆ0 − ρˆ1‖1 ≤
√
2D(ρˆ0‖ρˆ1),
Thus,
P
(w)
e ≥
1
2
−
√
1
8
D(ρˆ⊗n0 ‖ρˆ⊗n1 ). (S26)
QRE is additive for tensor product states:
D(ρˆ⊗n0 ‖ρˆ⊗n1 ) = nD(ρˆ0‖ρˆ1). (S27)
By Lemma 5,
D(ρˆ0‖ρˆ1) = ηbn¯T ln (1 + ηwn¯+ ηbn¯T )ηbn¯T
(ηwn¯+ ηbn¯T )(1 + ηbn¯T )
+ ln
1 + ηwn¯+ ηbn¯T
1 + ηbn¯T
. (S28)
The first two terms of the Taylor series expansion of the RHS of (S28) with respect to n¯ at n¯ = 0 are zero
and the fourth term is negative. Thus, using Taylor’s Theorem with the remainder, we can upper-bound
equation (S28) by the third term as follows:
D(ρˆ0‖ρˆ1) ≤ η
2
wn¯
2
2ηbn¯T (1 + ηbn¯T )
. (S29)
Combining equations (S26), (S27), and (S29) yields:
P
(w)
e ≥
1
2
− ηwn¯
√
n
4
√
ηbn¯T (1 + ηbn¯T )
(S30)
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Therefore, setting
n¯ =
4ǫ
√
ηbn¯T (1 + ηbn¯T )√
nηw
(S31)
ensures that Willie’s error probability is lower-bounded by P
(w)
e ≥ 12 − ǫ over n optical modes.
Analysis (Bob): Suppose Bob uses a coherent detection receiver. A homodyne receiver, which is more
efficient than a heterodyne receiver in the low photon number regime28, induces an AWGN channel with noise
power σ2b =
2(1−ηb)n¯T+1
4ηb
. Since Alice uses Gaussian modulation with symbol power n¯ defined in equation
(S31), we can upper-bound P
(b)
e by11 (Equation (9)):
P
(b)
e ≤ 2B−
n
2 log2(1+n¯/2σ
2
b ), (S32)
where B is the number of transmitted bits. Substitution of n¯ from (S31) into (S32) shows that O(√n) bits
can be covertly transmitted from Alice to Bob with P
(b)
e < δ for arbitrary δ > 0 given large enough n.
Before proving Theorems 7 and 8, we state a lemma that is used in their proofs.
Lemma 6 (Classical relative entropy bound on Pe of binary hypothesis test) Denote by P0 and
P1 the respective probability distributions of observations when H0 and H1 is true. Assuming equal prior
probabilities for each hypothesis, the probability of discrimination error is Pe ≤ 12 −
√
1
8D(P0‖P1), where
D(P0‖P1) = −
∑
x p0(x) ln
p1(x)
p0(x)
is the classical relative entropy between P0 and P1 and p0(x) and p1(x) are
the respective probability mass functions of P0 and P1.
Proof. The minimum probability of discrimination error between H0 and H1 is characterized by
37 (Theorem
13.1.1):
minPe =
1
2
− 1
4
‖p0(x)− p1(x)‖1,
where ‖a− b‖1 is the L1 norm. By classical Pinsker’s inequality47 (Lemma 11.6.1),
‖p0(x)− p1(x)‖1 ≤
√
2D(P0‖P1),
and the lemma follows.
Theorem 7 (Dark counts yield square root law) Suppose that Willie has a pure-loss channel from Alice,
captures all photons transmitted by Alice that do not reach Bob, but is limited to a receiver with a non-zero
dark current. Let Alice and Bob share a secret of sufficient length before communicating. Then Alice can
lower-bound Willie’s detection error probability P
(w)
e ≥ 12 − ǫ for any ǫ > 0 while reliably transmitting O(
√
n)
bits to Bob in n optical modes.
Proof. Construction: Let Alice use a coherent state on-off keying (OOK) modulation {πi, |ψi〉〈ψi|}, i = 1, 2,
where π1 = 1 − q, π2 = q, |ψ1〉 = |0〉, |ψ2〉 = |α〉. Alice and Bob generate a random codebook with each
codeword symbol chosen i.i.d. from the above binary OOK constellation.
Analysis (Willie): Willie records vector yw = [y1, . . . , yn], where yi is the number of photons observed in
the ith mode. Denote by P0 the distribution of yw when Alice does not transmit and by P1 the distribution
when she transmits. When Alice does not transmit, Willie’s receiver observes a Poisson dark count process
with rate λw photons per mode. Thus, {yi} is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) sequence of
Poisson random variables with rate λw , and P0 = P
n
w where Pw = Poisson(λw). When Alice transmits,
although Willie captures all of her transmitted energy that does not reach Bob, he does not have access
to Alice’s and Bob’s codebook. Since the dark counts are independent of the transmitted pulses, each
observation is a mixture of two independent Poisson random variables. Thus, each yi ∼ Ps is i.i.d., with
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Ps = (1 − q)Poisson(λw) + qPoisson(λw + ηw|α|2) and P1 = Pns . By Lemma 6, P(w)e ≥ 12 −
√
1
8D(P0‖P1).
Since the classical relative entropy is additive for product distributions, D(P0‖P1) = nD(Pw‖Ps). Now,
D(Pw‖Ps) = −
∞∑
y=0
λywe
−λw
y!
log
[
1− q + q
(
1 +
ηw|α|2
λw
)
e−ηw|α|
2
]
(S33)
≤
q2
(
e(ηw|α|
2)2/λw − 1
)
2
where the inequality is due to the Taylor’s Theorem with the remainder applied to the Taylor series expansion
of equation (S33) with respect to q at q = 0. Thus,
P
(w)
e ≥
1
2
− q
4
√
n
(
e(ηw|α|2)2/λw − 1). (S34)
Therefore, to ensure that P
(w)
e ≥ 12 − ǫ, Alice sets
q =
4ǫ√
n
(
e(ηw|α|2)2/λw − 1) . (S35)
Analysis (Bob): Suppose Bob uses a practical single photon detector (SPD) receiver with probability
of a dark click per mode p
(b)
D . This induces a binary asymmetric channel between Alice and Bob, where
the click probabilities, conditional on the input, are P(click | input |0〉) = p(b)D and P(click | input |α〉) =
1 − e−ηb|α|2(1 − p(b)D ), with the corresponding no-click probabilities P(no-click | input |0〉) = 1 − p(b)D and
P(no-click | input |α〉) = e−ηb|α|2(1 − p(b)D ). At each mode, a click corresponds to “1” and no-click to “0”.
Let Bob use a maximum likelihood decoder on this sequence. Then the standard upper bound on Bob’s
average decoding error probability is48 P
(b)
e ≤ eB−nE0 , where B is the number of transmitted bits, and E0
is:
E0 = − ln

(1− p(b)d )
(
1− q
(
1− e− η|α|
2
2
))2
+
(
(1 − q)
√
p
(b)
D + q
√
1−
(
1− p(b)D
)
e−η|α|2
)2
The Taylor series expansion of E0 with respect to q at q = 0 yields E0 = qC +O(q2), where
C = 2e−ηn|α|
2/2
(
eηn|α|
2/2 − 1 + p(b)D −
√
p
(b)
D
(
eηn|α|2/2 − 1 + p(b)D
))
is a positive constant. Since q = O(1/√n), this demonstrates that O(√n) bits can be covertly transmitted
from Alice to Bob with P
(b)
e < δ for arbitrary δ > 0 given large enough n.
Theorem 8 (Dark counts yield square root law under structured modulation) Suppose that Willie has a
pure-loss channel from Alice, can capture all photons transmitted by Alice that do not reach Bob, but is limited
to a PNR receiver with a non-zero dark current. Let Alice and Bob share a secret of sufficient length before
communicating. Then Alice can lower-bound Willie’s detection error probability P
(w)
e ≥ 12 − ǫ for any ǫ > 0
while reliably transmitting O(
√
n
Q logQ) bits to Bob using n optical modes and a Q-ary PPM constellation.
Proof. Construction: Prior to communication, Alice and Bob secretly choose a random subset S of PPM
frames to use for transmission by selecting each of n/Q available PPM frames independently with probability
ζ. Alice and Bob then secretly generate a vector k containing |S| numbers selected independently uniformly
at random from {0, 1, . . . , Q − 1}, where |S| denotes the cardinality of S. Alice encodes a message into a
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codeword of size |S| using an ECC that may be known to Willie. She adds k modulo Q to this message and
transmits it on the PPM frames in S.
Analysis (Willie): Willie detects each PPM frame received from Alice, recording the photon counts in
yw = [y
(w)
1 , . . . ,y
(w)
n ] where y
(w)
i = [y
(w)
i,1 , . . . , y
(w)
i,Q ] and y
(w)
i,j it the number of photons observed in the j
th
mode of the ith PPM frame. Denote by P0 the distribution of yw when Alice does not transmit and by
P1 the distribution when she transmits. When Alice does not transmit, Willie’s receiver observes a Poisson
dark count process with rate λw photons per mode, implying that yw is a vector of nQ i.i.d. Poisson(λw)
random variables. Therefore, {y(w)i } is i.i.d. with y(w)i ∼ Pw and P0 = Pnw, where Pw is the distribution of
Q i.i.d. Poisson(λw) random variables with p.m.f.:
p0(y
(w)
i ) =
Q∏
j=1
λ
y
(w)
i,j
w e−λw
y
(w)
i,j !
. (S36)
When Alice transmits, by construction, each PPM frame is randomly selected for transmission with
probability ζ. In each selected PPM frame, a pulse is transmitted using one of Q modes chosen equiprobably.
Therefore, in this case {y(w)i } is also i.i.d. with y(w)i ∼ Ps and P1 = Pns , where the p.m.f. of Ps is:
p1(y
(w)
i ) = (1− ζ)
Q∏
j=1
λ
y
(w)
i,j
w e−λw
y
(w)
i,j !
+
ζ
Q
Q∑
m=1
(ηw|α|2 + λw)y
(w)
i,me−ηw|α|
2−λw
y
(w)
i,m !
Q∏
j=1
j 6=m
λ
y
(w)
i,j
w e−λw
y
(w)
i,j !
. (S37)
Since the classical relative entropy is additive for product distributions, D(P0‖P1) = nQD(Pw‖Ps). Now,
denoting by x = [x1, · · · , xQ] where xj ∈ N0, we have:
D(Pw‖Ps) = −
∑
x∈NQ0
Q∏
j=1
λ
xj
w e−λw
xj !
log
[
1− ζ + ζ
Q
Q∑
m=1
(
1 +
ηw|α|2
λw
)xm
e−ηw|α|
2
]
(S38)
≤
ζ2
(
e(ηw|α|
2)2/λw − 1
)
2Q
where the inequality is due to the Taylor’s Theorem with the remainder applied to the Taylor series expansion
of equation (S38) with respect to ζ at ζ = 0. By Lemma 6, ζ = 4ǫQ√
n(e(ηw |α|2)2/λw−1)
ensures that Willie’s
error probability is lower-bounded by P
(w)
e ≥ 12 − ǫ.
Analysis (Bob): As in the proof of Theorem 7, Bob uses a practical SPD receiver with probability of a
dark click p
(b)
D . Bob examines only the PPM frames in S. If two or more clicks are detected in a PPM frame,
a PPM symbol is assigned by selecting one of the clicks uniformly at random. If no clicks are detected,
the PPM frame is labeled as an erasure. After subtracting k modulo Q from this vector of PPM symbols
(subtraction is not performed on erasures), the resultant vector is passed to the decoder. A random coding
argument43 (Theorem 5.6.2) yields reliable transmission of O
(√
n
Q logQ
)
covert bits.
Theorem 9 (Converse of the square root law) Suppose Alice only uses n-mode codewords with total photon
number variance σ2x = O(n). Then, if she attempts to transmit ω(
√
n) bits in n modes, as n → ∞, she is
either detected by Willie with arbitrarily low detection error probability, or Bob cannot decode with arbitrarily
low decoding error probability.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 1, Alice sends one of 2M (equally likely) M -bit messages by choosing
an element from an arbitrary codebook {ρˆAnx , x = 1, . . . , 2M}, where a state ρˆA
n
x = |ψx〉A
nAn〈ψx| encodes
an M -bit message Wx. |ψx〉A
n
=
∑
k∈Nn0 ak(x) |k〉 is a general n-mode pure state, where |k〉 ≡ |k1〉 ⊗
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|k2〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |kn〉 is a tensor product of n Fock states. The mean photon number of a codeword ρˆAnx is
n¯x =
∑
k∈Nn0 (
∑n
i=1 ki)|ak(x)|2, and the photon number variance is σ2x =
∑
k∈Nn0 (
∑n
i=1 ki)
2|ak(x)|2 − n¯2x =
O(n). We limit our analysis to pure input states since, by convexity, using mixed states as inputs can only
deteriorate the performance (since that is equivalent to transmitting a randomly chosen pure state from an
ensemble and discarding the knowledge of that choice).
Willie uses a noisy PNR receiver to observe his channel from Alice, and records the total photon count
Xtot over n modes. For some threshold S that we discuss later, Willie declares that Alice transmitted when
Xtot ≥ S, and did not transmit when Xtot < S. When Alice does not transmit, Willie observes noise:
X
(0)
tot
= XD +XT , where XD is the number of dark counts due to the spontaneous emission process at the
detector, andXT is the number of photons observed due to the thermal background. Since the dark counts are
modeled by a Poisson process with rate λw photons per mode, both the mean and variance of the observed
dark counts per mode is λw . The mean of the number of photons observed per mode from the thermal
background with mean photon number per mode n¯T is (1− ηw)n¯T and the variance is (1− ηw)2(n¯T + n¯2T ).
Thus, the mean of the total number of noise photons observed per mode is µN = λw +(1− ηw)n¯T , and, due
to the statistical independence of the noise processes, the variance is σ2N = λw + (1 − ηw)2(n¯T + n¯2T ). We
upper-bound the false alarm probability using Chebyshev’s inequality:
PFA = P(X
(0)
tot
≥ S)
≤ nσ
2
N
(S − nµN )2 , (S39)
where equation (S39) is due to the memorylessness of the noise processes. Thus, to obtain the desired P∗FA,
Willie sets threshold S = nµN +
√
nσ2N/P
∗
FA.
When Alice transmits codeword ρˆA
n
u corresponding to messageWu, Willie observesX
(1)
tot
= Xu+XD+XT ,
where Xu is the count due to Alice’s transmission. We upper-bound the missed detection probability using
Chebyshev’s inequality:
PMD = P(X
(1)
tot < S)
≤ P
(
|X(1)
tot
− ηwn¯u − nµN | ≥ ηwn¯u −
√
nσ2N
P∗FA
)
≤ nσ
2
N + η
2
wσ
2
u
(ηwn¯u −
√
nσ2N/P
∗
FA)
2
, (S40)
where equation (S40) is due to the independence between the noise and Alice’s codeword. Since σ2u = O(n),
if n¯u = ω(
√
n), then limn→∞ PMD = 0. Thus, given large enough n, Willie can detect Alice’s codewords that
have mean photon number n¯u = ω(
√
n) with probability of error P
(w)
e ≤ ǫ for any ǫ > 0.
Now, if Alice wants to lower-bound P
(w)
e , her codebook must contain a positive fraction of codewords with
mean photon number upper-bounded by n¯U = O(√n). Formally, there must exist a subset of the codebook{
ρˆA
n
u , u ∈ U
}
, where U = {u : n¯u ≤ n¯U}, with |U|2M ≥ κ and κ > 0. Suppose Bob has an unattenuated
pure-loss channel from Alice (ηb = 0 and n¯T = 0) and access to any receiver allowed by quantum mechanics.
The decoding error probability P
(b)
e in such scenario clearly lower-bounds the decoding error probability in
a practical scenario where the channel from Alice is lossy and either the channel or the receiver are noisy.
Denote by Ea→k the event that a transmitted message Wa is decoded as Wk 6=Wa. Since the messages are
equiprobable, the average probability of error for the codebook containing only the codewords in U is:
P
(b)
e (U) =
1
|U|
∑
a∈U
P
(∪k∈U\{a}Ea→k) . (S41)
Since the probability that a message is sent from U is κ,
P
(b)
e ≥ κP(b)e (U). (S42)
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Equality holds only when Bob receives messages that are not in U error-free and knows when the messages
from U are sent (in other words, equality holds when the set of messages on which decoder can err is reduced
to U). Denote by Wa, a ∈ U , the message transmitted by Alice, and by Wˆa Bob’s decoding of Wa. Then,
since each message is equiprobable and |U| = κ2M ,
log2 κ+M = H(Wa) (S43)
= I(Wa; Wˆa) +H(Wa|Wˆa) (S44)
≤ I(Wa; Wˆa) + 1 + (log2 κ+M)P(b)e (U) (S45)
≤ χ
({
1
|U| , ρˆ
An
u
})
+ 1 + (log2 κ+M)P
(b)
e (U) (S46)
where (S44) is from the definition of mutual information, (S45) is due to classical Fano’s inequality47 (Equa-
tion (9.37)), and (S46) is the Holevo bound I(X ;Y ) ≤ χ({pX(x), ρˆx})49. The mutual information I(X ;Y )
is between a classical input X and a classical output Y , which is a function of the prior probability dis-
tribution pX(x), and the conditional probability distribution pY |X(y|x), with x ∈ X and y ∈ Y. The
classical input x maps to a quantum state ρˆx. A specific choice of a quantum measurement, described by
POVM elements {Πy, y ∈ Y}, induces the conditional probability distribution pY |X(y|x) = Tr [Πyρˆx]. The
Holevo information, χ({px, ρˆx}) = S
(∑
x∈X pxρˆx
) −∑x∈X pxS(ρˆx), where S(ρˆ) ≡ −Tr[ρˆ ln ρˆ] is the von
Neumann entropy of the state ρˆ, is not a function of the quantum measurement. Since ρˆA
n
u = |ψu〉A
nAn〈ψu|
is a pure state, χ
(
{ 1|U| , ρˆA
n
u }
)
= S
(
1
|U|
∑
u∈U |ψu〉A
nAn〈ψu|
)
. Denote the “average codeword” in U by
ρ¯A
n
= 1|U|
∑
u∈U |ψu〉A
nAn〈ψu|, and the state of the jth mode of ρ¯An by ρ¯Anj . We obtain ρ¯A
n
j by tracing
out all the other modes in ρ¯A
n
and denote its mean photon number by n¯j (i.e. n¯j is the mean photon
number of the jth mode of ρ¯A
n
). Finally, denote a coherent state ensemble with a zero-mean circularly-
symmetric Gaussian distribution by ρˆTn¯ =
1
πn¯
∫
e−|α|
2/n¯|α〉〈α|d2α. The von Neumann entropy of ρˆTn¯ ,
S
(
ρˆTn¯
)
= log2(1 + n¯) + n¯ log2
(
1 + 1n¯
)
. Now,
S
(
ρ¯A
n
)
≤
n∑
j=1
S
(
ρ¯A
n
j
)
(S47)
≤
n∑
i=1
log2(1 + n¯j) + n¯j log2
(
1 +
1
n¯j
)
(S48)
≤ n
(
log2
(
1 +
n¯U
n
)
+
n¯U
n
log2
(
1 +
n
n¯U
))
, (S49)
where (S47) follows from the sub-additivity of the von Neumann entropy and (S48) is due to ρˆTn¯ maximizing
the von Neumann entropy of a single-mode state with mean photon number constraint n¯28. Now, S
(
ρˆTn¯
)
is
concave and increasing for n¯ > 0, and, since
∑n
j=1 n¯j ≤ n¯U by construction of U , the application of Jensen’s
inequality yields (S49). Combining (S46) and (S49) and solving for P
(b)
e (U) yields:
P
(b)
e (U) ≥ 1−
log2
(
1 + n¯Un
)
+ n¯Un log2
(
1 + nn¯U
)
+ 1n
log2 κ
n +
M
n
. (S50)
Substituting (S50) into (S42) yields the following lower bound on Bob’s decoding error probability:
P
(b)
e ≥ κ

1− log2
(
1 + n¯Un
)
+ n¯Un log2
(
1 + nn¯U
)
+ 1n
log2 κ
n +
M
n

 (S51)
Since Alice transmits ω(
√
n) bits in n modes, M/n = ω(1/
√
n) bits/symbol. However, since n¯U = O(√n),
as n → ∞, P(b)e is bounded away from zero for any κ > 0. Thus, Alice cannot transmit ω(√n) bits in n
optical modes both covertly and reliably.
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II. DETAILS OF THE EXPERIMENTAL METHODS
Here we provide the mathematical details of the experimental methods.
Calculation of Bob’s maximum throughput
The Q-ary PPM signaling combined with Bob’s device for assigning symbols to received PPM frames
induces a discrete memoryless channel described by a conditional distribution P(Y |X), where X ∈ {1, . . . , Q}
is Alice’s input symbol and Y ∈ {1, . . . , Q, E} is Bob’s output symbol with E indicating an erasure. Since
Bob observes Alice’s pulse with probability 1− e−n¯(b)det , P(Y |X) is characterized as follows:
P(Y = x|X = x) =
(
1− e−n¯(b)det
)Q−1∑
i=0
1
i+ 1
(
p
(b)
D
)i (
1− p(b)D
)Q−1−i
+ e−n¯
(b)
det
Q∑
i=1
1
i
(
p
(b)
D
)i (
1− p(b)D
)Q−i
P(Y = E|X = x) = e−n¯(b)det
(
1− p(b)D
)Q
P(Y = y, y /∈ {x, E}|X = x) = 1− P(Y = x|x) − P(Y = E|x)
Q− 1
The symmetry of this channel yields the Shannon capacity34 Cs = I(X ;Y ), where P(X = x) =
1
Q for
x = 1, . . . , Q and I(X ;Y ) is the mutual information between X and Y . We use the experimentally-observed
values from Table I to compute Cs for each regime, and plot
Csζn
Q since
ζn
Q is the expected number of PPM
frames selected for transmission.
Derivation of the log-likelihood ratio test statistic
The log-likelihood ratio test statistic is given by L = f1(xw)f0(xw) , where f0(xw) and f1(xw) are the likelihood
functions of the click record xw corresponding to Alice being quiet and transmitting. Click record xw
contains Willie’s observations of each PPM frame on his channel from Alice xw = [x
(w)
1 , . . . ,x
(w)
n/Q]. x
(w)
i =
[x
(w)
i,1 , . . . , x
(w)
i,Q ] contains the observation of the i
th PPM frame with x
(w)
i,j ∈ {0, 1}, where “0” and “1” indicate
the absence and the presence of a click, respectively. When Alice does not transmit, Willie only observes
dark clicks. Thus, each xw is a vector of i.i.d. Bernoulli
(
p
(w)
D
)
random variables. The likelihood function of
xw under H0 is then:
f0(xw) =
n/Q∏
i=1
(
p
(w)
D
)∑Q
j=1 x
(w)
i,j
(
1− p(w)D
)Q−∑Qj=1 x(w)i,j
.
Now consider the scenario when Alice transmits. The secret shared between Alice and Bob identifies the
random subset S of the PPM frames used for transmission, and a random vector k which is modulo-added
to the codeword. Modulo addition of k effectively selects a random pulse location within each PPM frame.
Note that, while both the construction in the proof of Theorem 4 and Alice’s encoder described in the
Methods generate S first and then k, the order of these operations can be reversed: we can first fix a random
location of a pulse in each of n/Q PPM frames, and then select a random subset of these frames. Consider
Willie’s observation of the ith PPM frame, and suppose that the lth mode is used if the frame is selected
for transmission. Denote the probability of Willie’s detector observing Alice’s pulse by p
(w)
r = 1 − e−n¯(w)det .
By construction, frames are selected for transmission independent of each other with probability ζ. Willie’s
detector registers a click on this mode when one of the following disjoint events occurs:
• PPM frame is selected and pulse is detected by Willie (probability ζp(w)r );
23
• PPM frame is selected, but Willie, instead of detecting it, records a dark click (probability
ζ
(
1− p(w)r
)
p
(w)
D ); and,
• PPM frame is not selected, but Willie records a dark click (probability (1− ζ)p(w)D ).
The probability of the union of these events is
p(w)s = ζp
(w)
r
(
1− p(w)D
)
+ p
(w)
D , (S52)
and, thus, Willie observes an independent Bernoulli
(
p
(w)
s
)
random variable in the lth mode of the ith PPM
frame. Since Alice only uses the lth mode for transmission, in modes other than the lth, Willie observes a
set of Q − 1 i.i.d. Bernoulli
(
p
(w)
D
)
random variables corresponding to dark clicks. The click record x
(w)
i of
the ith PPM frame is independent of other PPM frame and, thus, the likelihood function of xw under H1 is
P1(xw = x) =
∏n
i=1 p1(x
(w)
i ) where
f1(xw) =
n/Q∏
i=1
1
Q
Q∑
l=1
(
p(w)s
)x(w)i,l (
1− p(w)s
)1−x(w)i,l (
p
(w)
D
)∑Q
j=1
j 6=l
x
(w)
i,j
(
1− p(w)D
)Q−1−∑Qj=1
j 6=l
x
(w)
i,j
.
Evaluation of the likelihood ratio yields:
f1(xw)
f0(xw)
=
n/Q∏
i=1
1− ζp(w)r
Q
Q∑
l=1

1 + ζp(w)r(
1− ζp(w)r
)
p
(w)
D


x
(w)
i,l
=
n/Q∏
i=1
[
1− ζp(w)r +
ζp
(w)
r y
(w)
i
Qp
(w)
D
]
(S53)
where y
(w)
i =
∑Q
l=1 x
(w)
i,l and the simplification yielding (S53) is due to x
(w)
i,l ∈ {0, 1}. Taking the logarithm
of equation (S53) yields the log-likelihood ratio in (1).
Gaussian approximation of P
(w)
e
For small ζ, the Taylor series expansion of the summand in (1) at ζ = 0, log
[
1 + ζp
(w)
r
(
y
(w)
i
Qp
(w)
D
− 1
)]
≈
ζp
(w)
r
(
y
(w)
i
Qp
(w)
D
− 1
)
, yields an approximation for the log-likelihood ratio: L ≈ ζp(w)r
Qp
(w)
D
(∑n/Q
i=1 y
(w)
i − np(w)D
)
.
Thus, effectively, Willie uses the total click count Y =
∑n/Q
i=1 y
(w)
i as a test statistic, which explains the lack
of sensitivity of our test to the variations in the observed channel characteristics given in Table I.
This also provides an analytical approximation of P
(w)
e . First consider the case when Alice is not trans-
mitting. Then the total click count is a binomial random variable Y ∼ B
(
y; p
(w)
D , n
)
whose distribution,
for large n, can be approximated using the central limit theorem by a Gaussian distribution Φ
(
y;µ0, σ
2
0
)
with µ0 = np
(w)
D and σ
2
0 = np
(w)
D
(
1− p(w)D
)
, where Φ
(
x;µ, σ2
)
= 1√
2πσ
∫ x
−∞ e
− |t−µ|2
2σ2 dt is the distribu-
tion function of a Gaussian random variable N (x;µ, σ2). Now consider the case when Alice is transmit-
ting. Since S and k are unknown to Willie, the total click count is the sum of two independent but
not identical binomial random variables Y = X + Z, where X ∼ B
(
x; p
(w)
D , n− nQ
)
is the number of
dark clicks in the n − nQ modes that Alice never uses in a PPM scheme and Z ∼ B
(
z; p
(w)
s ,
n
Q
)
is the
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contribution from the nQ modes that Alice can use to transmit, with p
(w)
s defined in (S52). By the cen-
tral limit theorem, for large n, the distribution of X can be approximated using a Gaussian distribution
Φ(x;µX , σ
2
X) where µX =
(
n− nQ
)
p
(w)
D and σ
2
X =
(
n− nQ
)
p
(w)
D
(
1− p(w)D
)
. Similarly, the distribution of
Z can be approximated by a Gaussian distribution Φ
(
z;µZ, σ
2
Z
)
where µZ =
n
Q
(
ζp
(w)
r +
(
1− ζp(w)r
)
p
(w)
D
)
and σ2Z =
n
Q
(
ζp
(w)
r +
(
1− ζp(w)r
)
p
(w)
D
)(
1− ζp(w)r
)(
1− p(w)D
)
. Thus, the distribution of Y can be approx-
imated by a Gaussian distribution Φ
(
y;µ1, σ
2
1
)
with µ1 = µX + µZ and σ
2
1 = σ
2
X + σ
2
Z via the additivity
property of independent Gaussian random variables. Willie’s probability of error is thus approximated by:
P˜
(w)
e =
1
2
min
S
(1 − Φ(S;µ0, σ20) + Φ(S;µ1, σ21)). (S54)
The value of the threshold S∗ that minimizes the RHS of (S54) satisfies |S
∗−µ0|2
σ20
− log(σ21/σ20) = |S
∗−µ1|2
σ21
.
